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Abstract: Exports of agricultural commodities to developed countries play a significant role in 
the economies of many developing countries.  The elimination of import tariffs has the potential 
to benefit producers in the developing countries, but estimates of the effect of trade liberalization 
typically assume perfect competition.  Significant concentration in the food processing and 
retailing sectors of the U.S. and the EU undermine the plausibility of this assumption in the case 
of agricultural trade, however.  Sexton, Sheldon, McCorriston, and Wang (SSMW, 2007) 
developed a model of the effects of trade liberalization that accounts for the vertically-linked and 
concentrated characteristics of the developed countries’ food markets.  Their principal qualitative 
finding is that an analysis based on the assumption of competitive conduct will overstate the 
effects of trade liberalization if food processing and retailing firms exercise market power.  This 
result is sensitive to their choice of functional forms, however, as this paper demonstrates with 
an analysis in which SSMW’s linearity assumption is replaced by constant elasticity 
specifications for supply and demand.  We also extend the SSMW analysis by considering ad 
valorem tariffs, a case for which the results exhibit both qualitative and quantitative differences 
from those for the unit tariff case. 
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 1. Introduction. 
 Agriculture plays a key role in developing countries’ economies.  According to the 
United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization, agriculture’s share in developing countries’ 
GDP is a little more than ten percent, but more than half of the economically active population is 
engaged in this sector (FAO 2004, Table A4).  The majority of developing countries’ export 
earnings come from a few agricultural commodities, and, therefore, trade in agriculture has more 
significant implications for the low income countries than for the rich countries.  In recognition 
of these facts, increasing the access of low-income, agricultural commodity exporting countries 
to developed countries’ markets has been one of the central issues in the last several rounds of 
World Trade Organization negotiations. 
 Motivated by the belief that increased access to developed countries’ markets will boost 
producers’ earnings and accelerate economic growth, developing countries advocate the 
elimination of high agricultural tariffs.1  Agricultural imports from developing countries are used 
as raw materials for the food and beverage industries in the developed countries, however, and 
the impact of trade liberalization in agricultural commodity markets will depend on conduct in 
these industries.  An increasing pace of consolidations and rising market concentration in 
developed countries’ food processing and retailing sectors raises the prospect of non-competitive 
conduct by firms in these sectors.2  Although most agricultural trade policy analyses in the 
literature rely on the competitive market paradigm, Sexton, Sheldon, McCorriston, and Wang 
(SSMW, 2007) have incorporated the vertically-linked and concentrated characteristics of 
developed countries’ food markets in their analysis of the impact of agricultural trade 
liberalization on developing countries’ economic development.3  The SSMW model assumes 
price-taking behavior by farmers in the developing country and consumers in the developed 
country, but allows for possible oligopoly/oligopsony conduct by food processors and retailers in 
the developed country.  Their main qualitative result is that an analysis based on the assumption 
of competitive conduct will overstate the impact of the removal of a tariff if firms exercise 
market power.  Using their model, they calculate the magnitude of the upward bias in the 
competitive model’s estimates of the effects of trade reform, for various patterns and degrees of 
market power in the developed country’s marketing channel.
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 The SSMW model assumes linear farm supply and retail demand curves.  As they note, 
however, the choice of a functional form for demand and supply is not innocuous in an analysis 
of tax incidence.  In particular, their choice of linear specifications predestines their main 
qualitative finding of smaller effects of trade liberalization for the case of market power than for 
the case of perfect competition.  SSMW also confine their analysis to the case of removal of a 
unit tariff, while noting that a natural extension would address the prevalent case of an ad 
valorem tariff.  This case is of potential interest because an ad valorem tariff, unlike a unit tariff, 
changes the slope of the tax-inclusive supply curve, making it less elastic and increasing the 
potential for the exercise of oligopsony power. 
In this paper, we extend the SSMW analysis in two obvious directions:  We replace their 
linear demand and supply specifications with constant elasticity functional forms, and we 
investigate the effects of trade liberalization in the cases of both unit and ad valorem tariffs.  The 
switch to constant elasticity functions reverses SSMW’s finding that trade reform has a smaller 
impact with market power than with competitive conduct.  The intuition for this result is 
straightforward and is presented in the next section.  The results for unit and ad valorem tariffs 
have important qualitative as well as quantitative differences. 
 
2. Extensions of the SSMW framework. 
 The choice of linear specifications for supply and demand predestines SSMW’s finding 
of smaller effects of trade liberalization for the case of market power than for the case of perfect 
competition.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the intuition of this result in a simple setting.  There is a 
single marketing stage standing between farm supply of the raw commodity and retail demand 
for the final processed product.  A fixed proportions relationship holds between quantities at the 
farm and retail levels, so that both quantities can be measured in the same units, and the 
marketing sector operates at constant marginal cost.  In a perfectly competitive equilibrium with 
a tariff, depicted in Figure 1, the spread between the retail and farm prices, ௥ܲכ െ ௙ܲכ, would be 
the sum of marginal marketing cost and the tariff wedge.  The retail and farm prices and the tariff 
are observed; on the assumption of perfect competition, the portion of the price spread in excess 
of the tariff is attributed to marginal marketing cost.  As a result of trade liberalization, the tariff 
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wedge is removed and equilibrium quantity increases from ܳכ to ܳככ, the point at which the 
farm-retail price spread is equal to marginal cost alone. 
With a linear demand curve, marginal revenue for a monopoly marketing sector would be 
linear and twice as steep as demand.  The tariff equilibrium in Figure 2 involves the same linear 
demand and supply curves, the same tariff wedge, and the same initial values for quantity and 
farm and retail prices as in Figure 1.  But in Figure 2, this status quo tariff equilibrium is 
assumed to be a monopoly equilibrium leading to a different inference about the magnitude of 
marginal cost.  Marginal marketing cost plus the tariff, in this monopoly equilibrium, determines 
the size of the gap between the farm price and marginal revenue, not the retail price.  
Eliminating the tariff shrinks this gap but, because the marginal revenue curve is steeper than 
demand, removal of the tariff wedge results in a smaller quantity adjustment in this case than in 
the case of competitive equilibrium.  The distance between ܳכ and ܳככ is smaller in Figure 2 
than in Figure 1. 
Figure 2 illustrates the special case of monopoly equilibrium.  In a monopsony case, 
equilibrium would occur at the quantity for which marginal marketing cost plus the tariff (if any) 
would equal the difference between the demand price and marginal factor cost.  Because the 
marginal factor cost curve is linear and twice as steep as supply, the quantity adjustment 
resulting from the elimination of a tariff would also be smaller for monopsony than for perfect 
competition.  Finally, any particular imperfectly competitive equilibrium could be characterized, 
in the familiar way, as an outcome in which marketing firms acted as if they faced a “perceived” 
marginal revenue curve (a weighted average of demand and marginal revenue) and a “perceived” 
marginal factor cost curve (a weighted average of supply and marginal factor cost).  These 
curves would also be linear and steeper than demand (in the case of perceived marginal revenue) 
or supply (in the case of perceived marginal factor cost), so the model would also predict a 
smaller quantity response to trade liberalization for oligopoly/oligopsony than for perfect 
competition. 
With constant elasticity specifications for both demand and supply, it is less clear how 
the effects of trade liberalization under market power would compare to predictions based on the 
assumption of competitive behavior.  The constant elasticity functional form for either demand 
or supply (in inverse form) is 
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ܲ
where ܲ is price, ܳ is quantity, and ܽ is a positive constant.  In the case of demand, ߚ ൌ െ 1 ߟൗ ൏
0, where ߟ ൐ 0 is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand.  In the case of supply, ߚ ൌ
1 ߝൗ ൐ 0, where ߝ ൐ 0 is the elasticity of supply.  Marginal revenue or marginal factor cost are 
given by 
ൌ ܽܳఉ, 
 ௗሺ௉ொሻ
ௗொ
ൌ ܽሺ1 ൅ ߚሻܳఉ, 
and perceived marginal revenue or perceived marginal factor cost are given by ܽሺ1 ൅ ߠߚሻܳఉ, 
where ߠ, a “conduct parameter,” is between 0 and 1.  A value of 1 for ߠ corresponds to pure 
monopoly or monopsony whereas a value of 0 corresponds to competitive conduct.  The slopes 
of demand/supply, on the one hand, and perceived marginal revenue/factor cost, on the other, are 
ܽߚܳఉିଵ and ܽߚሺ1 ൅ ߠߚሻܳఉିଵ, respectively.  For supply, with ߚ ൐ 0, perceived marginal factor 
cost is steeper than supply at any given quantity, and we have the same qualitative result as in the 
case of linear functional forms:  The effects of tariff elimination would be greater under 
competition than under oligopsony.  For demand, however, with ߚ ൏ 0 (but |ߠߚ| ൏ 1 to insure 
the positive perceived marginal revenue necessary for an equilibrium), demand is steeper than 
perceived marginal revenue.  With a constant elasticity demand curve, the effects of trade reform 
would be smaller under competition than under oligopoly, a prediction that reverses the result for 
the linear case.  In replacing SSMW’s linear functional forms with constant elasticity 
specifications for both supply and demand, it is thus no longer clear a priori how the effects of 
trade reform in the presence of market power will compare to those in the competitive 
benchmark case.  So to discover the direction of any bias in estimates based on the competitive 
paradigm, it is necessary to perform a simulation analysis using a model calibrated to reflect the 
quantitative features of real-world agricultural commodity markets. 
 The SSMW analysis investigated the effects of the removal of a unit tariff but, as they 
note, many real world tariffs are ad valorem.  An ad valorem tariff makes the tax-inclusive 
supply curve of the farm commodity less elastic.  This creates greater scope for the exercise of 
oligopsony power in the farm market:  A given value for processors’ oligopsony conduct 
parameter will translate into a greater pricing distortion the less elastic is the supply curve.  This 
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means that there are greater potential benefits from the removal of an ad valorem tariff than from 
the removal of a unit tariff that involves the same dollar-per-unit tax assessment in equilibrium.  
So another goal of our analysis is to explore how the effects of trade liberalization differ for the 
cases of unit and ad valorem tariffs. 
 
3. The Model. 
 SSMW consider a setting in which farms in a developing country produce and export a 
primary commodity to a developed country.  The processors and retailers, which together 
comprise the downstream sector in the developed country, process the imported raw agricultural 
product and sell it to domestic consumers.  Trade in the primary commodity is subject to a tariff 
(either unit or ad valorem) imposed by the developed country.  Conversion of the farm product 
to the retail good does not allow substitution between the raw commodity and other inputs, so 
quantities at the farm, wholesale, and retail market stages can all be measured in retail-product-
equivalent units, for example, and denoted by the same variable.  Both processors and retailers 
operate at constant marginal cost.  Producers in the developing country and consumers in the 
developed country are price-takers, whereas processors and retailers may exercise market power 
in their input and output markets. 
 Let ܳ denote the quantity of the good and let ௥ܲ, ௪ܲ, and ௙ܲ denote the retail, wholesale, 
and farm prices, respectively.  The retail demand and farm supply functions can then be 
represented, in inverse form, by 
 ௥ܲ ൌ ܦ௥ሺܳሻ  and  ௙ܲ ൌ ௙ܵሺܳሻ. 
Adoptin nt elastic ications, we have, for demand and supply respectively: g consta ity specif
 ܳ ൌ ܣ ௥ܲ
ିఎೝ  and  ܳ ൌ ܤ ௙ܲ
ఌ೑, 
where ߟ௥ is the absolute value of the elasticity of retail demand, ߝ௙ is the elasticity of farm 
supply, and ܣ and ܤ are positive parameters.  Expressed in inverse form, these become: 
 ௥ܲ ൌ ܦ௥ሺܳሻ ൌ ቀ
ொ
஺
ቁ
ିଵ ఎೝൗ        (1) 
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and  ௙ܲ ൌ ௙ܵሺܳሻ ൌ ቀ
ொ
஻
ቁ
ଵ ఌ೑ൗ .       (2) 
Let ܿ௥ and ܿ௣ denote the marginal costs for retailers and processors, respectively. 
 As in SSMW, we will consider three scenarios for the exertion of market power by 
processors and/or retailers.  “Single stage market power” describes the case in which one stage, 
either processors or retailers, exercises market power in both its input and output markets while 
the other stage behaves competitively.  In “successive oligopsony,” retailers exert oligopoly 
power in their output (retail) market and oligopsony power in their input (wholesale) market, 
while processors are price takers in the wholesale market but exert oligopsony power over 
producers in the farm market.  In “successive oligopoly,” processors exert oligopsony power 
over producers in the farm market and oligopoly power over retailers in the wholesale market.  
Retailers are price takers in the wholesale market but exert oligopoly power over consumers in 
the retail market.  Like SSMW, we do not treat the case of bilateral oligopoly in the wholesale 
market. 
3.1. Single stage market power. 
 First assume that processors have some degree of market power in both their input and 
output markets while retailers behave competitively.  More specifically, start with the special 
case of processor pure monopsony in the farm market and pure monopoly in the wholesale 
market.  As price takers, retailers will purchase the wholesale product up to the point at which 
retail pr  lesale price plus retailers’ marginal cost: ice is equal to the who
 ௥ܲ ൌ ܦ௥ሺܳሻ ൌ ௪ܲ ൅ ܿ௥, 
confron ng olesale (inverse) demand function: ti  processors with the wh
 ௪ܲ ൌ ܦ௪ሺܳሻ ؠ ܦ௥ሺܳሻ െ ܿ௥.       (3) 
Profit fo  thr e processing sector is given by 
 Π௣ ൌ ܦ௪ ሻܳ െ ൫ ௙ܵሺܳሻ ൅ ܶ൯ܳ െ ܿ௣ܳ, ሺܳ
for the case of a ܶ dollar unit tariff, or 
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 Π௣ ൌ ܦ௪ሺܳሻܳ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ௙ܵሺܳሻܳ െ ܿ௣ܳ, 
for the case of an ad valorem tariff at proportionate rate ݐ.  For the unit tariff case, differentiating 
the profit function with respect to ܳ and setting the result to zero yields 
 ௪ܲ ቀ1 െ
ଵ
ఎೢ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
ଵ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ, 
where ߟ௪ is the absolute value of the elasticity of wholesale demand.  Using equation (3) to 
substitute for ܲ  and ߟ : ௪ ௪
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ଵ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
ଵ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ.     (4) 
 Equation (4), a first-order condition for the maximization of processor sector profit for 
the case of pure monopsony/monopoly, can be adapted to accommodate intermediate degrees of 
input and/or output market power through a standard device involving “conduct parameters.”  
The result is 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೢ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ,     (5) 
where ߠ௪ reflects processors’ degree of oligopoly power in the wholesale market and ߶௙ reflects 
processors’ degree of oligopsony power in the farm market.  A value of 1 for ߠ௪ (߶௙) 
corresponds to pure monopoly (monopsony) while a value of 0 for ߠ௪ (߶௙) corresponds to price 
taking behavior in the wholesale (farm) market.  Thus, for the case of single stage market power 
in the hands of processors, and a unit tariff, equilibrium for the model is determined by equations 
(1), (2), (5), and (6): 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௥ܲ െ ܿ௥.         (6) 
For the ad valorem tariff case, equation (5) is replaced by equation (5’): 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೢ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣.    (5’) 
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 The case of single stage market power in the hands of retailers (retailers have 
oligopoly/oligopsony power and processors are price takers) works out in a very similar fashion.  
The equilibrium for this case is described by equations (1), (2), (7), and (8): 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
థೢ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ,     (7) 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௙ܲ ൅ ܶ ൅ ܿ௣,        (8) 
for the case of the unit tariff, and by equations (1), (2), (7’), and (8’): 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ൬1 ൅
థೢ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣,    (7’) 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ௙ܲ ൅ ܿ௣,        (8’) 
for the case of the ad valorem tariff.  In these expressions, ߠ௥ is a conduct parameter indexing 
retailers’ degree of oligopoly power in the retail market and ߶௪ is a conduct parameter indexing 
retailers’ degree of oligopsony power in the wholesale market.  The range of values for these 
indices is, again, 0 െ 1, with 0 identifying price taking behavior and 1 corresponding to pure 
monopoly or monopsony conduct.  Comparing equations (5) and (7), and equations (5’) and (7’), 
it is clear that, in both the unit tariff and the ad valorem tariff cases, for given degrees of buyer 
and seller market power, the equilibrium values for ௥ܲ, ௙ܲ, and ܳ are independent of whether the 
market power is exercised by retailers or processors. 
 As noted in the previous section, SSMW’s assumption of linear functional forms for 
supply and demand insures that the projected effects of trade liberalization will be smaller under 
market power than under competition.  One other consequence of linear functional forms is that, 
in the case of market power, the model always predicts that profit of the marketing sector 
increases with trade liberalization.  The marketing sector’s profit margin is simply the sum of 
oligopoly and oligopsony distortions.  Since linear specifications insure that these distortions 
always increase with quantity (for example, the vertical distance between demand and marginal 
revenue increases with quantity), and since trade liberalization always leads to an increase in 
quantity, marketing sector profit must go up as the tariff is removed.  With our model’s constant 
elasticity functional forms, this outcome is not assured.  Consider the case of processors’ market 
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power with a unit tariff, for example.  The profit margin is ௥ܲ െ ௙ܲ െ ܿ௥ െ ܿ௣ െ ܶ so, from 
equation (5), processing sector profit is 
 Π௣ ൌ ൬ ௥ܲ
஘ೢ
ఎೝ
൅ ௙ܲ
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ܳ. 
Substituting for ௥ܲ and ௙ܲ from equations (1) and (2) and differentiating: 
 ௗஈ೛
ௗொ
ൌ ఏೢ
ఎೝ
ቀ1 െ ଵ
ఎೝ
ቁ ௥ܲ ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൬1 ൅ ଵ
ఌ೑
൰. 
If demand is inelastic (an assumption reflected in the values we use later for calibration of the 
model), profit decreases with quantity, and therefore with trade liberalization, if there is 
oligopoly power only (߶௙ ൌ 0), but increases with trade liberalization if there is oligopsony 
power only (ߠ௪ ൌ 0).
4 
3.2. Successive oligopsony. 
 In this scenario, processors exercise oligopsony power over producers but are price takers 
in their output (wholesale) market, while retailers have market power in both their input 
(wholesale) and output (retail) markets.  The first step is to derive processors’ supply function 
and, to that end, we begin by assuming that processors have pure monopsony power over 
produce . t  fit for the processing sector is rs  For he case of a unit tariff, pro
 Π௣ ൌ ௪ܲܳ െ ൫ ௙ܵሺܳሻ ൅ ܶ൯ܳ െ ܿ௣ܳ. 
The first order condition is 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௙ܵሺܳሻ ൬1 ൅
ଵ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ, 
which can be adapted to accommodate intermediate degrees of market power as follows: 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௙ܵሺܳሻ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ,      (9) 
where, as before, ߶௙ indexes processors’ degree of oligopsony power.  Equation (9) defines the 
supply function that retailers face in the wholesale market:   ܲ ௪ ൌ ܵ௪ሺܳሻ. 
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 Retail sector profit is given by 
 Π௥ ൌ ܦ௥ሺܳሻܳ െ ܵ௪ሺܳሻܳ െ ܿ௥ܳ, 
leading to the first order condition 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௪ܲ ቀ1 ൅
థೢ
ఌೢ
ቁ ൅ ܿ௥,      (10) 
where ߠ௥, ߟ௥, and ߶௪ are as previously defined and ߝ௪ is the elasticity of wholesale supply.  
Using equation (2) to substitute for ௙ܵሺܳሻ in equation (9) and solving yields: 
 ܳ ൌ ܤ ቌ௉ೢ ି௖೛ି்
ଵା
ഇ೑
ഄ೑
ቍ
ఌ೑
. 
Differentiating: 
 ߝ௪ ൌ
ௗொ
ௗ௉ೢ
௉ೢ
ொ
ൌ ߝ௙
௉ೢ
௉ೢ ି௖೛ି்
. 
Substituting this expression into equation (10), using equation (9) to substitute for ௪ܲ, and 
simplifying, the result is: 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൬1 ൅ థೢ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ.    (11) 
Finally, for the successive oligopsony case with a unit tariff, equilibrium is described by 
equations (1), (2), (11), and (12), a slightly modified version of equation (9): 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ.       (12) 
The successive oligopsony case with an ad valorem tariff is described by equations (1), (2), 
(11’), and (12’): 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൬1 ൅ థೢ
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣   (11’) 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௙ܲሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௣      (12’) 
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3.3. Successive oligopoly. 
 In this scenario, retailers exercise oligopoly power over consumers but are price takers in 
their input (wholesale) market, while processors have market power in both their input (farm) 
and output (wholesale) markets.  In this case, the analysis begins with a derivation of retailers’ 
demand for the wholesale product, and proceeds to a first order condition characterizing profit 
maximization for the processing sector.  Omitting details, equilibrium, in the case of the unit 
tariff, is determined by equations (1), (2), (13), and (14): 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ቀ1 െ ఏೢ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣ ൅ ܶ    (13) 
 ௪ܲ ൌ ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ െ ܿ௥       (14) 
In the case of the ad valorem tariff, equilibrium is determined by equations (1), (2), (13’), and 
(14): 
 ௥ܲ ቀ1 െ
ఏೝ
ఎೝ
ቁ ቀ1 െ ఏೢ
ఎೝ
ቁ ൌ ௙ܲሺ1 ൅ ݐሻ ൬1 ൅
థ೑
ఌ೑
൰ ൅ ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣   (13’) 
 
4. Calibrating and Solving the Model. 
 Our analysis of the effects of trade liberalization will use the following approach.  We 
will first calibrate the model to insure that its status quo tariff equilibrium reflects representative 
values for supply and demand elasticities, and for the tariff’s and farmers’ shares of retail price.  
Then we will consider various scenarios for market power in the marketing channel.  Each 
scenario will imply a different breakdown of the after-tariff balance of the farm-retail price 
spread into marginal processing and retailing costs, on the one hand, and oligopoly/oligopsony 
pricing distortions, on the other.  For each scenario, we will use the first-order condition for the 
appropriate model to solve for the implied value of marginal marketing cost, ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣.  Holding 
marginal cost fixed at this level and setting the tariff parameter equal to zero, the model will then 
be re-solved to determine the free trade values of ܳ, ௥ܲ, and ௙ܲ. 
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 As an illustration of this exercise, consider the case of a unit tariff and the market power 
scenario of successive oligopsony characterized by specific values for the conduct parameters, 
ߠ௥, ߶௙,  and ߶௪.  Given assumed demand and supply elasticities, and calibrated values for ௥ܲ, ௙ܲ, 
and ܶ, equation (11) can be solved for ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣.  Holding marginal cost fixed at this level, setting 
ܶ equal to zero to reflect trade liberalization, and substituting from equations (1) and (2) with 
calibrated values of demand and supply parameters ܣ and ܤ, equation (11) becomes an equation 
nonlinear in a single unknown, ܳ.  It can be solved by numerical methods for the free-trade 
equilibrium value for quantity.  Substitution back into equations (1) and (2) gives the free-trade 
equilibrium values of retail and farm prices.5   
 In their simulation analysis, SSMW calibrated the model to reflect representative values 
for supply and demand elasticities, and for the farmers’ and the tariff’s share of the retail price.  
But their calibration method imposed these representative values at a hypothetical free-trade 
competitive equilibrium, rather than at the actual status quo equilibrium, which involved a tariff 
and was assumed to incorporate market power.  This leads, in some cases, to sizeable differences 
between these representative values and the actual status quo equilibrium values of the 
parameters.6  Thus, their comparisons of the impact of trade reform for different assumptions 
about the degree of status quo market power confound the effects of changing conduct with the 
effects of changing demand and supply elasticities.  To avoid this problem we calibrate our 
model to exhibit representative elasticities and the farmers’ and the tariff’s shares of retail price 
at the status quo equilibrium instead of at the free-trade competitive equilibrium. 
 To begin, we normalize units so that the initial tariff equilibrium quantity corresponds to 
ܳכ ൌ 100, and the initial tariff equilibrium producers’ price (net of the tariff) corresponds to 
௙ܲ
כ ൌ 1.  From equation (2), this fixes the value of ܤ at 100, regardless of the value of supply 
elasticity.  SSMW cite representative examples of imported agricultural commodities for which 
the farmers’ share of retail price is in the range of 5% to 10%.  We calibrate the model to a 
status quo tariff equilibrium retail price of ௥ܲכ ൌ 15, implying a farmers’ share of 6.67%.  With 
ܳכ ൌ 100,  ௥ܲכ ൌ 15, and given a value for demand elasticity, equation (1) fixes the value of the 
demand parameter:  ܣ ൌ 100 15ିఎೝ⁄ .  We assume retail demand and farm supply elasticities of 
0.6 (ߟ௥ ൌ ߝ௙ ൌ 0.6ሻ, as do SSMW.  Finally, again following SSMW, we consider the effects of 
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elimination of a tariff, either unit or ad valorem, that, in the status quo equilibrium, amounts to 
20% of the farm price.  Thus we take ܶ or ݐ ௙ܲכ to be 0.2, implying that ݐ ൌ 0.2. 
 
5. Simulation Results. 
 Using the normalizations and the methods described in the previous section, we 
simulated the effects of trade liberalization for both unit and ad valorem tariffs for each of the 
following market power scenarios: single-stage, oligopsony only; single-stage, oligopoly only; 
single-stage, oligopoly and oligopsony; successive oligopsony; and successive oligopoly.  Once 
again, “successive oligopsony” refers to retailer oligopoly and oligopsony combined with 
processor oligopsony.  And “successive oligopoly” refers to processor oligopoly and oligopsony 
combined with retailer oligopoly.  For the cases in which market power is exercised in more than 
one market, the simulations could be performed for any combinations of values for the conduct 
parameters.  For purposes of illustration only, we show results for the symmetric cases in which 
all non-zero conduct parameters share a common value.  So for the case of successive 
oligopsony, for example, we show results for cases in which ߠ௥ ൌ ߶௙ ൌ ߶௪. 
 The results of the simulations are presented in Figures 3 and 4.  These figures depict the 
quantity impacts of trade liberalization for each of the market power scenarios described above, 
with symmetric conduct parameter values in the range ሾ0, 0.35ሿ, and for both unit (Figure 3) and 
ad valorem (Figure 4) tariffs.7  In each case, the quantity effects of removal of the tariff are 
expressed as a proportion of the quantity effect that the model would predict based on an 
assumption of competitive conduct.8  Thus the focus of these Figures is on the errors that would 
result if forecasts of the impact of trade liberalization were based on an erroneous assumption of 
competitive conduct. 
 For the case of market power and a unit tariff, Figure 3 shows that projections undertaken 
assuming competition would overstate the true effects only in the case of single-stage 
oligopsony, and then only slightly.  For example, with single-stage oligopsony and ߶ ൌ 0.35, the 
actual quantity impact of the removal of a unit tariff would be 96.4% of that predicted for the 
competitive case.  For any scenario involving oligopoly power in at least one stage, the actual 
effects of trade liberalization exceed those that would be calculated based on the competitive 
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paradigm, and sometimes quite dramatically so.  For example, in the successive oligopoly case 
with conduct parameter values of 0.35, the quantity effect would be 3.86 times larger than in the 
competitive case.  Again, these findings contrast with SSMW’s results based on a model in 
which the assumption of linear functional forms guarantees smaller impacts for the market power 
cases. 
 In another departure from SSMW’s results, the incorporation of additional layers of 
market power does not always affect trade liberalization’s impacts monotonically.  For example, 
with a unit tariff, oligopsony (only) in the retail stage, and ߶ ൌ 0.25, the quantity effect of the 
removal of the tariff is 0.974 times the quantity effect for competition.  With the retail sector 
exercising oligopoly power over consumers as well as oligopsony power over processors, and 
ߠ ൌ ߶ ൌ 0.25, the quantity effect increases to 1.580 times the competitive effect.  But now 
adding another layer of market power, oligopsony at the processor level to give us our 
“successive oligopsony” scenario, the quantity effect for ߠ ൌ ߶ ൌ 0.25 falls to 1.491 times the 
competitive effect.  In general, the addition of a new oligopoly stage to a given market power 
scenario increases the effects of trade reform, whereas the addition of a new oligopsony stage 
slightly mitigates them.  The discussion in Section 2 provides the intuition for this result.  For 
oligopsony with a constant elasticity supply curve, as with a linear supply curve, the perceived 
marginal factor cost curve is steeper than supply, insuring a smaller quantity adjustment to the 
removal of a tariff wedge.  For oligopoly, perceived marginal revenue is flatter than demand and 
the quantity adjustment is magnified. 
 With a unit tariff, as Figure 3 illustrates, the introduction of oligopsony power at one or 
more stages tends to mitigate the effects of trade liberalization because perceived marginal factor 
cost is steeper than supply.  For the ad valorem tariff case with oligopsony power, there is a 
countervailing effect:  An ad valorem tariff makes the supply curve facing processors less elastic 
thus increasing the scope for the exercise of market power and increasing the oligopsony 
distortion for any given conduct parameter value.  Eliminating an ad valorem tariff thus tends to 
reduce the oligopsony distortion at a given quantity and this, by itself, would lead to a bigger 
quantity response to trade liberalization.  Figure 4’s plot of the effects of tariff removal for the ad 
valorem case shows that this second effect outweighs the first.  Even for the case of single-stage 
oligopsony, the effects of trade liberalization are greater (with ߶ ൌ 0.35, for example, 1.534 
 16 / 22
 15 
 
times greater) than the projected effects based on an assumption of competition.  Moreover, 
adding an oligopsony stage to a particular market power scenario always increases the impact of 
the removal of the tariff.  For example, starting with oligopoly power at the retail stage only, and 
ߠ ൌ 0.25, the quantity effect is 1.649 times the competitive effect.  Adding oligopsony at the 
retail stage, with ߶ ൌ ߠ ൌ 0.25, the effect increases to 2.250 times the competitive effect.  
Going from single stage oligopoly and oligopsony at the retail level to successive oligopsony by 
adding oligopsony power at the processor level, the quantity impact, with ߶ ൌ ߠ ൌ 0.25, jumps 
to 3.026.  There is also a significant difference in the magnitudes of the effects of trade 
liberalization for the unit tariff and ad valorem tariff cases.  For example, with a unit tariff and 
successive oligopoly with conduct parameters equal to 0.1, the quantity effects of removal of the 
tariff are 38.5% greater than the effect with competition.  With an ad valorem tariff, the same 
market power scenario, and the same conduct parameter values, the quantity effect is 61.9% 
greater than that predicted for competition. 
 
6. Conclusion. 
 For many developing countries, the majority of their export earnings are attributable to 
agricultural commodities sold to developed countries and subject to tariffs.  The removal of these 
tariffs will increase the volume of trade and the prices received by developing country producers.  
But because these commodities are used as inputs in the food processing and retailing industries 
of the developing countries, firm conduct within these industries will have an influence on the 
magnitudes of the effects of trade liberalization.  Sexton, Sheldon, McCorriston, and Wang 
(SSMW, 2007) carried out an analysis of the role of downstream market power in determining 
the effects of trade liberalization for the case of a unit tariff.  Their model predicts more modest 
impacts of trade reform when firms in the processing and retailing sectors exercise market power 
than when they behave competitively.  Unfortunately, that qualitative result is sensitive to their 
choice of linear forms for the farm supply and retail demand functions, as we show with our 
extension to the case of constant elasticity specifications.  We also consider the case of an ad 
valorem tariff which is shown to have results that differ both qualitatively and quantitatively 
from the results for the unit tariff case.  
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Notes: 
1. The belief that liberalization of trade is beneficial to producers in developing countries is not 
universally accepted.  McMillan et al. (2002) and Wilcox and Abbott (2004) discuss examples 
from the Mozambique cashew nut sector and the Ivory Coast cocoa market, respectively, in 
which the gains from liberalization appear to have largely been captured by processors or 
exporters in the developing countries rather than farmers. 
2. Sexton, et al. (2007) summarize the findings of several studies detailing the extent of 
concentration in food processing and retailing in the U.S. and the EU. 
3. Ahn and Lee (2010) is one recent example of agricultural trade policy analysis that accounts 
for market power in the food marketing channel. 
4. In the case of an ad valorem tariff with oligopsony power, trade liberalization is more likely to 
result in a decrease in marketing sector profit.  In this case, elimination of the tariff makes the 
supply curve more elastic and therefore reduces the scope for the exercise of oligopsony power 
and, for a given conduct parameter, reduces the oligopsony distortion at any given quantity. 
5. A decomposition of marginal marketing cost, ܿ௥ ൅ ܿ௣, into processors’ and retailers’ shares 
would be required in order to use equation (12) to solve for the free-trade equilibrium value of 
wholesale price, ௪ܲ. 
6. For example, SSMW imposed supply and demand elasticities of 0.6 at the free-trade 
competitive equilibrium.  But, in their “successive oligopsony” case, with uniform values of 0.2 
for the conduct parameters, the actual demand and supply elasticities at the tariff equilibrium are 
1.20 and 0.45, respectively.  For successive oligopsony with conduct parameter values of 0.4, 
the corresponding elasticities are 1.65 and 0.34. 
7. The structure of the model imposes restrictions on the range of relevant values for the conduct 
parameters.  For example, equation (13’) for the successive oligopoly, ad valorem tariff case 
must be consistent with positive marginal cost in order to be meaningful.  Given the model’s 
normalizations for prices ( ௥ܲ ൌ 15 and ௙ܲ ൌ 1), and the calibrated values of the model’s 
parameters (ߟ௥ ൌ ߝ௙ ൌ 0.6 and ݐ ൌ 0.2), and assuming symmetric conduct parameter values, this 
requires ߠ௥ ൌ ߠ௪ ൌ ߶௙ ൏ 0.3828.  The other market power scenarios, for both ad valorem and 
unit tariffs, are less restrictive in this respect.  Thus limiting attention to conduct parameter 
values in the interval ሾ0, 0.35ሿ will insure consistency for all of the cases. 
8. The comparisons of quantity effects between market power and competitive scenarios are 
quite reflective of the corresponding comparisons for other magnitudes of interest.  For example, 
in the case of a unit tariff and single stage market power with ߠ ൌ ߶ ൌ 0.2, Figure 3 shows that 
the quantity effect of trade liberalization would be 41.6% greater than the quantity effect of the 
removal of the tariff in the competitive case.  Likewise, the effects on ௥ܲ, ௙ܲ, and consumer and 
producer surplus in this market power case would exceed the impacts that the competitive model 
would predict for these variables by amounts ranging from 40.9% to 42.1%. 
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Figure 1.  The effects of trade liberalization with competition. 
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Figure 2.  The effects of trade liberalization with monopoly. 
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Figure 3.  Quantity effects of trade liberalization – unit tariff case. 
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Figure 4.  Quantity effects of trade liberalization – ad valorem tariff case. 
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